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When state-owned  enterprises  in socialist  economies  are re-
formed by leasing them to entrepreneurs  - when the state
cannot  manage  its own  enterprise  efficiently  - how  can  the  state
evaluate  the effectiveness  of reform? By measuring  the firm's
profit level.
The Policy, Rescarch. and External Affairs Conplex  distributes PRE Working Papers to disseminate the findings of work in progress
and to encourage the exchange  of ideas among Bank  staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carry  the names
of the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The fundings,  interpretatins,  and conclusions  are  the
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and  ExtemdI  Affairs
Pubilc  Economics
This paper  - a product  of the Public  Economics  Division,  Country  Economics  Department  - is part  of
a larger effort in PRE to understand  the transitional  problem  of state-owned  enterprises  in socialist
economies  and to suggest reforms  consistent  with movement  towards  a market economy. Copi-s are
available  free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW, Washington  DC 20433. Please  contact Ann
Bhalla,  room N1O-059,  extension  37699  (33 pages).
Schjelderup  discusses  the reform  of state-owned  the state is unable  to manage  its own enterprise
enterprises  in socialist  economies  by leasing  efficiently? Clearly,  the state  has to rely  only on
them to entrepreneurs. He recommends  lease  observed  outcomes.
payments  to the state based on fee schedules
from the principal-agent  literature.  Despite  the state's inability  to evaluate
actions,  outcomes  can be judged  by a simple
The aim of the principal  (the state) in this  measure: the firn's  profit level.
literature  is to get the agent (entrepreneur/lessee)
to act in the state's interest. The state does so by  Using  the firm's profit level as a basis for
rewarding  the agents  for observed  actions  and  sharing  rulce  between  the lessee  and lessor,
outc4omes.  Schjelderup  offers advice  on how to structure
What is the process  of evaluation,  however,
when  the reform  process  is based  on the fact that
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Many countries  within the socialist  world have embarked  upon a
Journey to reform their economic systems.  These  reforms have been
triggered  by the aggravation  of inefficiencies  in the system  which have
recently  led  to a decline  in economic  growth  in some countries. One main
task in this  reform  process  is the  restructuring  of the  enterprise  sector.
At the heart of this problem  is the transition  from centrally  planned  to
autonomous  enterprises. Since the state owns the factors  of production,
new  rules  of ownership  have to  be developed  that  improve  efficiency  and  are
politically  and  socially  acceptable.
The enterprise  reforms  undertaken  so far have had as their  main
objective the increase of efficiency  and, hence, productivity  in firms
which  for decades  have  performed  notoriously  poorly.  This  has  been sought
by moving  away  from  the extremely centralized control of  resource
allocation  to a more decentralized  system  providing  market-like  incentives
to public enterprises.  The system of central planning,  defined as
detailed  physical  commands  to enterprises  arnd  sectors,  is to a certain
degree  being dismantled. Recent  indications  of this  have been reductions
both  in p-rsonnel  and  in  the  number  of  responsibilities  of  the
administrating  agencies in several countries.  These changes  have been
backed  by legislation  on enterprise  autonomy. New laws,  such  as the  Soviet
law on state enteLprises  of June 1987, the management  system  in Hungary-2-
(1985)  and the management  contracting  system  in China (1981),  have all
aimed at enhancing  enterprise  autonomy  by separating  management  functions
from the  ownership  and regulatory  framework  of the  state.  The idea  behind
this  is that autonomous entities are more flexible and have clearer
objectives. In accordance  with this  strategy,  the  management  function  of
public enterprises has  been delegated to such groups as enterprise
councils,  general  assemblies  of workers, contract management  and
shareholder  companies  (China).  To further induce  firms to behave like
private firms in market economies,  bankruptcy  laws have been enacted in
Hungary  (1986) and  China  (1988).  In addition, countries such as
Yugoslavia, Poland and the USSR have a number of procedures for the
liquidation  of enterprises  though  these  are  rarely  applied  in  practice.
Despite  these  efforts,  the overall  picture  is still  one in which
enterprises  are  plagued  by the  inefficiencies  that  are  deeply  rooted  in the
structure  of socialist  economies. Many critics  have claimed  that this is
because the reforms  implemented  so far have failed  to change the highly
centralized  and bureaucratic  superstructure  of these economies.  Several
authorsl  have recently  pointed  out some major obstacles  still facing  the
reform  process. The  most important  of these  seem  to  be:
1.  The  problem  of the  ownership  of assets.
2.  Constraints  on investment  decisions  and  credit.
3.  Price  and  profit  regulations.
4.  Soft  budget  constraints.
I/  See  Hewett  (1989),  Nuti (1989),  Nagaoka  (1989)  and  Kochav  (1989).-3-
We will investigate  these obstacles  in detail  below to give a
background  and perspective  to the theoretical  framework  needed to solve
these  problems.
1.  The Problem  of the OwnershiR  of Assets.  Since the start  of
the reform process,  property  rights to assets  have _-reated  problems  in
state  owned  enterprises..  As it is  now, enterprises  are  not allowed  to own
their assets  and their  dutonomy  to use resources  is still  limited.  This
has meant that they have few incentives  to manage  and accumulate  assets.
It seems  that the  problem  is not only one of defining  the  property  rights
to assets  but also  one  of defining  these  in  such  a  manner  that  they  improve
the efficiency  of enterprises. The  experience  so far,  even in China  where
experiments  with shareholder  companies  are  being  conducted,  indicates  that
the separation  of ownership  and management  creates  problems  in socialist
economies.  Since  western  firms  seem to be operating  more efficiently,  it
might  be useful  to  draw  some  parallels.
In western-style  enterprises,  the board is supposed  continuously
to represent  the  owners.  Since  a board  works  closely  with management  and
has the  power in most cases,  to exercise  ownership  rights,  the separation
of ownership  and management  is limited  to matters  of extreme importance.
Whether the board under all circumstances  takes decisions that fully
reflect  the owners'  interest  is another  matter.  But what is clear from
this organizational  structure  is that  management  and ownership  rights  are
relatively well integrated and that this structure produces superior
results  in terms  of productivity. Moreover,  boards  are made up of large
shareholders  and businessmen  who are rewarded if they perform well and-4-
punished if they fail.  The reward and punishment  of board members in
western enterprises ore perceived to happen through reputation  effects
based on the company's  performance  in the  stock  market.  Such  performance
regulates the demand for a board member and is a precaution against
irresponsible  behavior. 2 Accordingly,  the problem  of property  rights  to
assets in socialist economies comes down to two factors - first,  how
ownership  is exercised  and second,  how the m-.-agement  of ownership  rights
is rewarded.  The western  way of solving this problem is to integrate
management  and  ownership  by delegating  ownership  rights  to  boards  except  in
the case of matters of extreme importance. This analysis  suggests  that
ownership  rights  must be delegated  in an appropriate  way and combined  with
an incentive-enhancing  reward structure.  The way property  rights are
currently  exercised  in  socialist  economies  paralyses  managerial  autonomy.
2.  Constraints  on Investment  Decisions  and Credit.  The problem
of property  rights  and ownership  is further  accentuated  by the  process  by
which firms have to get approval  for their investment  decisions.  Such
regulations  are still  widespread  in almost  all socialist  ._onomies.  Not
only does this limit the flexibility  of firms but  it also makes it
difficult  for  them to  plan ahead.  In addition,  the  approval  of investment
plans is often an excessively  long procedure  during  which their  aims are
often sidetracked. Since  the approving  agencies  do not  have to face the
consequences  of wrong  decisions,  there  are  no incentives  to select  the  most
/  For  more on the  efficiency  of boards  in  western  societies,  see  Meckling
and  Jensen  (1976).-5-
profitable  plans.  Hence,  approval  criteria  seem to be little  emphasized
and  are subject  to corruption. This problem  is  highlighted  by the lack  of
independent  profit-maximizing  credit  institutions.
3.  Price  and Profit Regulations.  Different ministries and
moLt.s%oring  agencies  continue  to regulate  prices  and wages.  Although in
some cases  both wages and prices  have been allowed  to float freely,  the
overall  picture is of very detailed  price and wage regulations.  These
constraints  further  dilute  the  desired  autonomy  between  management  and the
planning structure, since setting prices freely is one of the most
important parameters in a  firm's competitive  behavior.  In addition,
profit  retention is limited.  Though  it is reasonable  for the state to
capture rent from its assets, the benefits  from outstanding  performance
need to be shared  in a reasonable  way.  If this  fails  to happen,  there  is
no reward  for  increasing  productivity.
The motivation  behind  many of these  regulations  seems to be the
concern  about income  distribution. However,  wage and price controls  are
not the best way of  -ndling these  problems.  Taxes and transfers  can
accomplish  the same goals  more effectively. The paradox  seems  to be that
in socialist  economies,  where  planning  and  monitoring  are  the  foundation  of
the system,  many doubt the  ability  of the fiscal  system  to perform  such a
task.
4.  Soft  Budget  Constraints. Subsidies  or soft  budget  constraints
are  widespread  in the  public  sector  in  socialist  economies. The reason  for
this is that loss-making  firms  cannot  easily  be terminated  because  of the-6-
social  and political  costs involved.  However,  their  presence  creates a
moral  hazard  problem  since  an- irresponsible  behavior  on the  part of  public
enterprises  is likely  to  be forgiven  by the  government.  Hence,  they  dilute
enterprise  reform  efforts  by not inducing  management  to  behave  in a proper
manner.  To correct for this, measures have to be taken that provide
incentives  to  management  in their  activities.
II.  A THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK  FOR  ENTERPRISE  REFORMS.
The experiences of enterprise reforms In socialist economies
highlight several problems that seem to obstruct the transition from
centrally  planned  to autonomous  enterprises. As we have seen,  tuo of the
most difficult  tasks  appear  to be the  question  of the ownership  of assets
and how to delegate  decision-making  to the management  of enterprises.  In
reality,  this  is the  problem  of providing  incentives  to the  manager  which
make him behavs responsibly,  but which at the same time allow him the
flexibility  necessary to run the firm in an ever changing  environment.
This  paper  finds  that  the  solution  to this  problem  is to lease  state  owned
enterprises  to entrepreneurs.
The lease  contract  will give the lessee  the right to manage  and
retain  profits  from a specific  firm over a certain  period  of time.  One
way of  viewing  dtis  lease  contract  is as if the  lessee  is running  the firm
on behalf  of the state.  The lessee  is responsible  for making  decisions
which  are in thL  state's  interest,  and in return  receives  a payment  which
can be viewed  as the profits  minus the lease cost.  However,  it is not
certain  that  the state  will receive  a lease  payment  from  the lessee. This-7-
will in general  depend  on the  profit  of the leased  firm.  The  profit  is a
function  both of the state  of the  world  and of how efficiently  the lessee
is managing the firm.  Therefore, the state has a strong inteiest  in
influencing  the  lessee's  behavior  to  make  him  act  efficiently. This  way of
looking  at a lease  contract  makes  it fruitful  to analyze  it as a principal-
agent  problem.
The theory  of principal  and agent is intended  to describe  the
following  problem. An outcome  x (for  example,  profits)  depends  on actions
chosen  by an individual,  called  the agent,  as well as on the  state  of the
world.  The outcome  generates  utility  to a second  individual,  called  the
principal,  who,  therefore,  has a strong  interest  in the  action  chosen. It
is assumed  that the  principal  and the  agent  are tied  together  in some  sort
of relationship that makes it possible  to arrange a contract  aimed at
controlling  the agent's  actions.  Since  actions  often  cannot  be observed,
a  fee  schedule  must  be defined  under  which  the  principal  makes  a payment  to
the  agent  that induces  the  agent  to take  actions  maximizing  the  principal's
utility  (for  example,  profits).
There  are many examples  of principal-agent  relationships  in real
life.  One such example  is the connection  between  an investment  bank and
one of its  brokers.  The  broker generates  income  to the bank through  his
activities  at the stock exchange.  This income  depends  not only on the
action  chosen,  but also  on market  conditions  outside  the  broker's  control.
A Black  Monday  may have catastrophic  consequences  for the  bank's  earnings
despite  good  efforts  from the  broker.  In some  cases,  the  general  cause  of
a bad  performance is not as obvious as a Black Monday.  Under such-8-
circumstances the broker may claim  that the state  of the world  is
responsible  for the low income  whereas the truth is that he was lazy.
Hence, there is an informational  asymmetry  between the two parties that
might lead the broker to behave irresponsibly.  The solution  to this
problem  demands  a special  fee  schedule  from  the  principal  to the  agent  that
provides  incentives  to the  agent  to act in the interest  of the principal.
The fee  schedule  should  be it1ated  to che  outcome  but  take into  account  the
uncertainty  posed  by different  states  of the  world.  This is exactly  what
the  theory  of principal  and  agent  is  meant  to  do.
There  are two  reasons  for  exploring  a lease  contract  as a  means  to
reform state owned enterprises  in socialist  economies.  First,  a  lease
contract viewed as a principal-agent  relationship can provide proper
incentives  for  efficient  management  in a situation  where  information  is  not
commonly  shared  and monitoring  is costly.  Second,  a lease  contract  might
be more politically  viable since it does not alter the structure of
ownership  and can, therefore,  be easily agreed  upon.  Moreover, such a
contract  might be terminated  after a period  of time and thereby  provides
easier  exit  possibilities  for  the  government.
In the  following  chapters,  we etamine  some  of the  results  from  the
principal-agent  literature to see how they can be applied to a lease
contract  as a means  of improving  efficiency  in the  enterprise  sector. Fee
schedules  that  determine  the  lessee's  salary  are  outlined, and  a
theoretical  as well as practical framework for implementing such fee
schedules  is developed.  In the last chapter,  some of the other problems
brought up in the introduction  are analyzed within a principal-agent
framework.-9-
III. THE  THEORY  OF PRINCIPAL  AND  AGENT
It is widely recognized among economists  that underlying  each
principal-agent  model is an incontive problem caused by some form of
asymmetric  information. The literature  distinguishes  between two types.
All models  where the agent  has exclusive  precontractual  information  about
his ability  or type are  labelled  adverse  selection. We will  not deal  with
these  models  here but refer to Arrow (1985).  In the  second  category  are
those models where actions  cannot  be observed.  The unobservability  of
actions might lead to opportunistic  behavior,  and these models are,
therefore,  placed  under  the  heading  of  moral  hazard  or  hidden  actions.
The  problem  of moral  hazard  generally  leads  agents  to take  actions
that are not  Pareto-optimal - in other words, if the agent behaved
differently,  he could  have increased  the  principal's  utility  without  making
himself worse off.  A natural remedy  for this incentive  problem is to
monitor  the  agent's  actions. But  monitoring  is  often  too  costly  or at  best
only  partly  possible,  so  other  solutions  have to  be found. Therefore, the
answer  is frequently  the arrangement  of a fee schedule  by a principal  to
his agent that gives the agent incentives  to act in the interest  of the
principal.  For such a schedule  to be Pareto-optimal,  it must implicitly
serve  to  create  appropriate  incentives  for  the  agent  in  his  activity  and to
allocate  the  risk  associated  with the  outcome  of the  agent's  activity  in  a
way that  is satisfactory  to  both  parties.-10-
For  the  purpose  of a lease  contract,  the  problem  will  be to find  a
fee schedule as described above.  Since this is a survey of the main
results from the principal-agent  theory, we will not mention a lease
contract  specifically  when discussing  the results. However,  these  results
may  very  well be incorporated  into  a lease  contract  where the  principal  is
the lessor and  the agent  the lessee.  Furthermore, the contractual
arrangements  reviewed  below  are  all the  outcome  of a one  period  model.  We
have omitted dynamic extensions  of the basic principal-agent  model for
several  reasons.  The improvements  that dynamic  models offer over a one
period  model are partly  based on a  learning  effect  on the part of the
principal  from repeatedly  evaluating  the agent's  actions.  This learning
effect takes time and might, in many cases,  require  more time than any
lease  contract  is  meant  to last.  Besides,  the  fact  that  we do nct observe
long term  relationships  or contracts  in real  life indicates  that  there  are
forces  at work here that  the  literature  has yet to discover. Interested
readers  are referred  to Hart and Holmstrom  '1987)  for an introduction  to
this  literature.
(1)  The construction  of fee  schedules.
A  central assumption  in the principal-agent  literature  is that
both  the principal and  the agent have identical probability beliefs
concerning  the  state  of the  world.  This  may not  alwaysz  be warranted  as it
might be thought  that the principal (the state)  in a socialist  economy
would possess better information  on the states  of the world.  However,
since the entire  literature is based on the assumption of identical
probability  beliefs,  we  have no choice  but to accept  it.-11-
Another crucial assumption  is that the fee schedule  can depend
only on variables  that both parties  can observe.  It is assumed  that the
agent  chooses  his action  before  the  state  of the  world  is  known  and  that  he
can  observe  both the  outcome  and  the state  of the  world.  Hence,  different
possibilities arise only  in respect to information  available to the
principal.  It is always  assumed  that the  principal  knows  the outcome  and
that the outcome  is a function  of the action  taken  and the state of the
world.  If the principal  can observe  actions,  for example,  he can deduce
the  state  of the  world  from  the  action  taken  and  its  outcome. This reduces
the  principal-agent  problem  to two  cases  of interest: 3
(1)  The  principal  knows  the  action.
(2)  The  principal  knows  only the  outcome.
Case (1) is not a problem  of asymmetric  information  as long as
actions  can  be observed  without  costs  and is, therefore,  one of providing
incentives  given  perfect  monitoring  capabilities.  A first  best solution  to
this  problem  is always  found  since, in case the agent  chooses an
inappropriate  action,  the  principal  can lower  the  agent's  fee  sufficiently
to deter  such  behavior. Fee schedules  in  this  case should  be set  according
to optimal  risk  sharing  with  an enforcing  constraint  that  lowers  the fee  if
.y  The following section draws heavily on Harris and Raviv  (1978),
Holmstrom  (1979),  Shavell  (1979)  and  Rees (1985a).-12-
the agent  behaves irresponsibly. 4 In most situations  in life,  actions
cannot  be observed  so this case seems to be of little  relevance.  More
importantly, even if actions  could  be observed,  fee schedules  based on
actions  could  not be used.  The reform  process  is based  on the assumption
that  the  state  is  unable  to  manage  its  own  enterprises  efficiently. Hence,
any corrective  measures  regarding  actions  from the principal  to the agent
neglect  the  reason  for  leasing. Case (2)  is  the  true  hidden  action  problem
where  the principal has  to construct a  fee  schedule that provides
incentives  without the ability to observe  actions.  Since this problem
applies  to most cases in real life and can avoid the incompetence  of the
state  to judge  actions,  we will analyze  it in  detail.
(2)  The  DrinciRal  knows  only  the  outcome.
The aim of this section is to construct  a contract  between a
principal  and an agent that shares  the outcome  resulting  from the agent's
activity. This contract,  which  will result  in a fee schedule,  must serve
two  purposes  at the  same  time.  First,  it  must insure  both parties  against
income  loss due to uncertainty  about  the state  of the world.  Second,  it
has  to provide  incentives  to the  agent  in  his  activity.  Since  the  principal
cannot  observe  actions,  he has to design  a fee  schedule  that  both  maximizes
his  utility  and  takes  into  account  the  agent's  response. Provided  that  the
agent receives  his reservation  utility,  he will choose  the action that,
combined  with the  fee  schedule,  maximizes  his  utility. Unforturately, the
A/  For  derivation  of optimal  risk  sharing  rules  see  later  in this  chapter.-13-
solution  to the  principal's  problem  is  not automatically  assured. We will
assume that a  solution exists to the problem, and for most practical
purposes  this  can  be justified. 5
The agent  must  choose  some  action,  a, from  a given  set  of actior.s
A.  Let B represent  the state  of the world drawn from a distribution  A.
The  state of the world  and  the agent's action jointly determine a
verifiable  outcome  X-ir(a,O).  We can  think  of this  outcome  as some  sort  of
monetary  payoff  which belongs to the  principal.  The agent's  choice  of a
makes  ir  a  random variable whose distribution is derived from A  via
wi-(a.0).  We will denote this distribution  f(w,a).  The principal's
problem is now to define  a contract  under which the principal  makes a
payment,  s(i),  to the  agent  that  induces  him to take  the  desired  action.
It is assumed  that the agent has an additive  separable  utility
function, U(s(r),a)  - U(s(O))  - c(a).  The  principal's utility  is
V(r -s(x)). The  problem  can  now  be stated  as:
(1)  Max  f  V(r - s(x))f(r,a)dw  over  all  a c  A,  s(-)  £  S.
subject  to:
(2) f  U(s(w))f(r,a)dw  - c(a)  2 UO.
(3) f  U(s(r))f(r,a)dr  - c(a)  2 f  U(s(r))f(r,a  )dw - c(a')  ,  all  a  E  A.
5/  See  Grossman  and  Hart (1983).-14-
The first  constraint  requires  that the agent is rewarded  with a
fee which is higher  than his reservation  utility  level  UO.  This utility
level could be  interpreted  as his alternative  wage.  In a socialist
economy,  the alternative  wage for  an agent  would  be the  average  salary  for
workers  in the  public  sector  with  comparable  skills. The second  constraint
assures  that the agent  behaves  rationally  given  the incentive  scheme. Put
differently,  for  a given  fee  schedule,  the  agent  will choose  his action  so
as to  maximize  his own  utility.
It is well known from the  theory  of principal  and agent  that the
reward scheme resulting from this maximization problem depends upon
attitude  to risk.  For our purposes,  it is natural to assume that the
principal  is always  risk  neutral  since  the state  can be assumed  to hold a
well diversified  portfolio. We will,  therefore,  only  examine  fee  schedules
where  the  principal  is risk  neutral  and the  agents  are  either  risk  neutral
or risk averse.  Moreover,  we will not go into further  detail  with the
mathematical  solution  to the above  maximization  problem, 6 the reason
being  that  this  is  a rather  technical  process  which  defies  the  intention  of
this paper.  We will, therefore,  proceed  by stating the results  of the
problem  with  respect  to  attitude  to risk.
§/ For a  more  technical  derivation of  these  schemes,  see,  for example,
Grossman  and  Hart (1983)  or Rees (1985).-15-
Risk  neutral  agent.  It is instructive  to examine  the  two  aspects
of a contract,  risk sharing  and the  provision  of incentives,  separately.
The problem  of optimal  risk sharing  is treated  in the literature  by fixing
the  agent's  action  arbitrarily  and then  maximizing  the  principal's  utility
for some given level of the agent's  utility.  Hence, the fee schedule
derived  from this is not intended  to provide incentives  since  any action
can  be chosen. The  maximization  merely  states  how the  fee  schedule  should
be structured  to  account  for  uncertainty  and  at the  same  time  to induce  the
agent  to stay  in the  relationship.
The result  of this  maximization  problem  is  known  from  Borch  (1962)
which is that the  principal  and the  agent's  marginal  rates  of substitution
between  any two  states  are  equal. Hence,  the  fee  will depend  upon attitude
to risk.  Optimal  risk sharing  with a risk  neutral  agent  results  in a fee
scheme  where the  agent  receives  the  outcome  minus  a constant,  which is the
principal's  share.  By allowing  the agent the outcome  minus a constant,
the agent will maximize  the expected  net return  since he bears all the
costs  of his actions  and is risk  neutral. Hence,  he can  act on behalf  of
the  principal  as  a perfect  insurer  against  the  risk  of  variation  in income.
The problem we are studying here is the necessity  to provide
simultaneously both risk sharing and incentives to the agent in his
activity.  Hence, the task of providing  incentives  might alter the fee
schedule described above. However, risk neutrality combined with the
optimal  risk sharing  scheme  leads the agent  always to choose  the  optimal
action  which, therefore,  mitigates  the problem  of moral  hazard.  It is
often stated, therefore, that information  has no value since, even if-16-
actions could have been perfectly monitored,  the resulting  information
would  not alter  the  structure  of the  contract. A different  way of  phrasing
this is to say that a contract  which specifies  a fee that is contingent
only on outcome  is at least  as good as one which  makes the  fee contingent
on the  action  and  the  state  of the  world  in  addition  to the  outcome.
Risk averse  agent.  If the agent is risk averse,  the problem Ls
more complex  because some risk sharing  benefits  have to be sacrificed  to
provide  the agent  with the right  incentives. Suppose  that the agent  were
to receive  the  outcome  minus a constant. This fee schedule  would subject
him to risk regarding  the state  of the world,  given the action  chosen.
Hence,  optimal risk sharing  is not achieved.  On the other  hand, if he
were given  a fixed  fee,  this  would  leave  him  with no incentive  to take  the
right action.  Hence, a  trade-off has  to be made between providing
incentives  and optimal  risk sharing.  Such a fee schedule  would make the
fee depend  to some extent  on the outcome,  but it would not require the
agent to bear all the  risk.  We can envisage  such a fee  schedule  as being
composed  of a fixed  fee  combined  with a  bonus  that  varies  with the  outcome.
The question arises as to whether the sharing rule has any particular
shape,  for  example,  linear. The answer  is  no.  In fact,  almost  any shape
is consistent  with the second  best solution  as long as the fee  depends  to
some extent  on the outcome.  However,  linear  schemes  of the type C +  an,
where C would be a 'basic  salary'  and a  a fixed  profit  share  bonus,  are
preferable  to  other  schemes. There  are  several  reasons  for  this.-17-
First,  linear  sharing  rules  are easy to construct  and  less  costly
than intricate  contracts  relying  on several  different  scenarios. Second,
and more important,  incentive  schemes  need to perform  well across  a wide
range of events  not specified  in the general  solution  to the principal-
agent  problem. Hence,  the  sharing  rule in  use  needs  to be robust. One  way
of allowing  for such robustness  is to allow the agent a richer set of
actions.  If the agent  faces  several  options,  intricate  schemes  trying  to
account  for them all  will perform  poorly.  Linear  schemes  are best suited
since they allow the agent to explore all options  without reducing  the
performance  of the incentive  scheme.  We will, therefore,  use a linear
sharing  rule.  The fee schedule  when the  principal  knows  only the outcome
is summarized  below:
THE STATE KNOWS  ONLY  THE  OUTCOME  (Xr)  FEE  SCHEDULE
RISK NEUTRAL  AGENT  THE  OUTCOME  (U)  MINUS  A CONSTANT(C)
- II  - C
RISK  AVERSE  AGENT  A CONSTANT  (C)  PLUS  A BONUS (a)
VARYING  WITH THE  OUTCOME  (U)
-0  C  +  am  ,  0 <  a  <  1.
Imperfectly  observable  actions.  Suppose  now that there exists  a
variable, y, which is correlated  with the agent's action and, hence,
provides  imperfect  information  about  the agent's  actions. The question  is
whether  such  information  should  be incorporated  into  a contract. It is not
obvious  that  such  information  is of any  value. The  use of information  like
this introduces  a new risk to the agent that the fee might reflect an
inaccurate  perception  of the  agent's  true  action. If the  principal  is risk
averse  too,  this  risk  would  be undesirable  for  him  as  well.-18-
Risk neutral agent,  It can be shown that if the agent is risk
neutral,  his fee will depend  on the  outcome  alone - in the  way described
above. As expected,  further  inforLation  has  no value.
Risk averse  agent.  It can be shown that if the agent is risk
averse,  his fee schedule  will always  depend  to some extent  on information
which the principal has about his actions.  The fee will, therefore,
consist  of one fixed  part plus a bonus  varying  with the information  about
the  value  of the  action  taken  as well  as the  outcome. However,  in the  case
of a risk averse  agent,  a first  best Pareto-optimum  is not achieved. The
reason  for  incorporating  information  like  this  into  the  contract  is  because
it presents a  more discriminatory way  of providing the agent  with
incentives  to increasc  his level  of effort. To understand  why, an example
is in  order.
Assume  that the  variable  y is not taken  into  account  and suppose
that the  agent  chooses  the optimal  action  but that  the state  of the  world
turns  out  badly,  resulting  in a low  outcome. The  principal  might  be led  to
believe that the low outcome  is caused  by the agent's  action.  Hence,  he
makes a low payment to the agent.  Conversely,  in the case of a high
outcome,  a correspondingly  high payment  could  be made to the agent,  even
though the agent had provided a low level of effort.  Each of these
possibilities  is clearly  undesirable  in terms  of providing  incentives  to
the agent.  By introducing  an imperfect  indicator  such as y, one reduces
the risk of rewarding a  low value action and penalizing  a high value
action.  It can be  shown that this improvement in the contract is-19-
sufficient  to outweigh  whatever  costs arise due to the extra uncertainty
imposed  by imperfect  monitoring. The result  of imperfect  monitoring  can  be
treated  as a special  result  of case (2)  and is  sunmmarized  below:
IMPERF.  OBSERVABLE  ACTIONS  THE  FEE  SCHEDULE
RISK  NEUTRAL  AGENT  THE  OUTCOME  MINUS  A CONSTANT
RISK  AVERSE  AGENT  A CONSTANT  PLUS  A BONUS  VARYING
WITH  THE  INDICATED  ACTION  AND
THE  OUTCOME
IV.  THE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  LEASE  CONTRACTS
In  the following,  we will concentrate  on the fee schedule  where
the principal cannot observe the agent's actions.  This is the most
realistic  case  and  requires  the  specification  of three  factors,  the  agent's
attitude to risk,  what is meant by outcome and how to specify the
parameters  (C,a) in the  fee  schedule.
Establishing  what is meant  by outcome.  Since this paper is an
extension  of the  principal-agent  literature  in the  sense  that  the  principal
is the state  and the agent is a lessee  managing  a state  owned  enterprise,
the outcome  should  be some measure  of social  welfare.  Accordingly,  the
agent's fee schedule  should  maximize  expected  social  welfare,  subject  to
the incentive constraint  of the agent.  However, since such a welfare
function  varies  between countries  and in addition  might be difficult  to
establish,  a social  welfare  function  containing  several  parameters  seems  to
be of little practical use.  Instead,  we will argue that the welfare
function  to be maximized  should  contain  only one parameter,  the  profit  of-20-
the  firm. There  are  three  reasons  for  this. First,  to  maximize  the  profit
of the firm is in the interest  of both  parties  since  their  income  from  the
lease  depends  upon the  level  of profit. Second,  we know from  micro-theory
that profit-maximizing behavior leads to the efficient use of input
factors.  This is so only  when prices  reflect  resource  scarcities. In a
socialist  economy  this is not the case.  The problem  can be overcome  by
subjecting  the firm to border  prices  or if they exist,  market prices  on
input factors,  and in addition,  allowing  the firm to set prices  on final
goods  freely.  Third,  the  profit  of the firm is easily  monitored  and hard
to manipulate.  To limit the possibility  of such manipulations,  only the
return  from  entrepreneurship  or pure  profits  should  be considered  to be the
outcome.  If other less  pure profit  measures  are taken  into account,  they
might  obscure  the  goal  of the firm  and  distort  its  behavior.
Setting  the size  of the  Rarameters  in the  fee  schedule.  Once the
outcome is defined,  the parameters  in the fee schedule  are ready to be
specified. Constants  and sharing  parameters  have to be set.  This is, in
reality,  a question  of economic  rent.  The parameters  in the fee schedule
should  be the result  of a strategy  that  maximizes  the principal's  revenue
from leasing.  Moreover,  the principal  should  object to any scheme  that
renders him less rent from the enterprise than if it was managed by
himself.  We will argue  that the optimal  strategy  for this  purpose  is an
auction  with reservation  prices  on the  parameters  in the  fee schedule  that
determine  the principal's  income  from leasing.  These reservation  prices
should  be based on the return  that the firm already  yields  to the state.
If no lessee  is willing to pay a higher  price for a lease contract  than
this,  then the state  is better  off  managing  the firm itself. However,  to
reveal  what  value  the  market  puts  on the  lease,  an auction  should  be held.-21-
The justification  for applying  auctions  to this problem,  even if
there  is  only one  bidder,  has to do with the special  type  of informational
asymmetry  encountered. Because  the principal  does not know how much the
potential  lessees  value the contract,  posting  a  'price'  is not optimal,
especially  if the supply  of contracts  is constrained. Such a price does
not exploit  the  fact that  some  lessees  might  be willing  to  bid more  before
the principal  hits the capacity  constraint.  Organizing  an auction is,
therefore,  the best solution  because  the  participants  will reveal  through
the  bidding  process  how  much they  value  the  contract.
The  question  now is  how such  an auction  should  be conducted.  Our
problem resembles that of a common value auction.  In a common  value
auction,  the realized  value of a lease is the same for all bidders,  but
bidders may have differing  estimates  ex ante of the common  value.  The
seller  in our auction,  the principal,  has a strong  bargaining  position.
Not only  does  he have the  power  to decide  the supply  of leases,  but he can
select  any institution  he likes  for  conducting  trade. The  optimal  strategy
for  a seller  in such  a strong  bargaining  position 7 is to  make  a take  it  or
leave  it  offer  to the  highest  valuation  buyer  that  extracts  all the  surplus
from  him.  However,  the success  of this strategy  depends  on the seller's
ability to extract information  about valuation from the buyer.  The
existence  of private  information  makes  such  a task  difficult.  Hence,  the
seller  has to find a strategy  that captures  as much as possible  of the
bidder's  valuation,  given this asymmetry  of information. Furthermore,  if
there are several bidders, they may have collusive arrangements  among
1/ See  Milgrom  (1987).-22-
themselves.  It is known from the theory  of auctions  that a sealed  bid
auction is the superior institution for eliminating this problem as
collusion  is  harder  to sustain  when  secret  price  concessions  are  possible.
The information  problem encountered  in connection  with auctions
like this often  has a dynamic  character. For  example,  after the  lease  is
signed,  new information  may be revealed  or conditions  existing  at the time
of the auction  might  have changed.  Such  changes  can seriously  affect  one
or both of the  parties  involved. This is really  the  question  of duration
of the lease contract.  In China, lease and management contracts  are
renegotiable  when price restraints  determining  reward to management  are
lifted.  This is important  when the  economy  is rapidly  being reformed  and
prices and price regulations  change.  We will not treat this problem in
detail  since  it  has to  be dealt  with on a case to case  basis.  However,  it
is clear that the instability  of an economy  which is in the process of
being  reformed makes even medium term relationships very difficult.
Therefore,  to allow  flexibility, the auction should be held on the
condition  that  it will  be possible  to renegotiate  on  variables  vulnerable
to changes  which  are  under  the  government's  control.
Asymmetric  information  in auctions of common value  has  an
additional  twist  since  winning  the auction  is itself  an informative  event.
The bidder  with the largest  bid must conclude  from the fact that he won
that the other participants  obtained  lower  estimates  of the common  value
than  he did.  This should  make  him revise  his estimate  of the  value  of the
contract  downwards. In reality,  this  is an  adverse  selection  problem, and
it is called the winner's  curse.  This adverse selection  problem is a-23-
function  of how many participants  there  are in the auction  as well as of
the degree  of uncertainty. If the number  of bidders  is increased, each
participant  will tend to bid more aggressively. The reason for this is
that,  with a greater  number  of rivals,  there  is less  room  to mark  up bids
relative to cost estimates and still win  the auction.  Given  some
uncertainty  about the value of the object  auctioned,  this increases  the
likelihood  of a winner  who  overestimates  the  object. Hence,  the  higher  the
number of bidders, the greater  the adverse select'on  problem.  However,
the release  of private  as well as public  information  may help reduce  the
adverse  selection  problem,  as bidders  utilize  the  additional  information  to
avoid  the  valuation  errors  which  underlie  the  winner's  curse.
Even though the theory  of auctions  has long traditions,  much
further  work needs  to be done  before  the literature  is capable  of handling
all possible  problems  that might arise.  In common  value models  such as
ours,  it is  the  equilibrium of the  first-price  sealed  bid auction  that  has
been studied  most extensively. 8 We do also  know that  first-price  sealed
bid auctions  with a minimum  price are applied  for oil leases  by the U.S
government  for  the  outer  continental  shelf. 9 The  minimum  price  is in line
with our discussion  above,  and the sealed  bid indicates  that collusion
otherwise  might  be a  big  problem. This  does  not,  however,  guarantee  that  a
first-price  sealed  bid auction  is  what is  appropriate  in this  case.
t/  Milgrom (1979),  Milgrom  and  Weber (1982),  Reece (1978),  Kagel  and Levin
(1986).
2/  Hendricks,  Porter  and  Boudreau  (1987).-24-
The problem of determining  attitude to risk.  The problem of
revealing  the  agent's  attitudes  to risk  can  be solved  by letting  the  agents
pick the fee schedule  by which they want to be rewarded.  Since a risk
averse  agent  would  be worse off  by selecting  a scheme  designed  for a risk
neutral  agent  and  vice versa,  an agent  always  has the incentive  to reveal
his true  nature  and  select  the  right  scheme.
Even though  the discussion  above  has in principle  solved  many of
the  problems  attached  to the  implementation  of a lease  contract  based  on a
principal-agent  incentive  scheme,  it is worth examining  the fee schedule
itself in further detail to see more specifically  how it should be
implemented.
ImRlementation  of the fee schedule,  Let Xr now denote pure
profits. It is instructive  to  write the  fee  schedule  again  and  to examine
it in  more  detail.
THE STATE  KNOWS  ONLY  THE  OUTCOME  (X)  FEE  SCHEDULE
RISK  NEUTRAL  AGENT  THE  OUTCOME  (H)  MINUS  A CONSTANT(C)
II  - C
RISK  AVERSE  AGENT  A CONSTANT  (C)  PLUS  A BONUS (a)
VARYING  WITH  THE  OUTCOME  (H)
*  C +an,  0  <  a<1.I
From the table,  it is clear that the principal  has to solve at
least three problems.  First, the agent has to reveal  his attitude  to
risk.  As pointed  out above,  this is done by presenting  him with the two-25-
alternative  schemes  and letting  him choose.  Second,  the parameters  (a,C)
in the two schemes  have to be specified. The sizes  of a  and C depend  on
the  agent's  attitude  to  risk.
If the agent is risk neutral,  the principal's  lease  payment is
determined  by C.  Any  level  of C that  is  below  the  rent  presently  extracted
from the  enterprise  is not acceptable. Hence,  only bids that exceed  this
reservation  level of C will be considered.  The winner is the highest
bidder. If the  agent  is risk  averse,  then  the  principal's  lease  payment  is
determined through the outcome minus the agent's fee: X  - C - aw  - w(l - a)
- C.  From the equation,  we see that the level  of C and  a  determines  the
lease  payments.  The  question now  is how  to find  the principal's
reservation  level  for  these  parameters. Again,  the  principal  should  object
to any solution  that renders  him less rent from the  enterprise  than if it
was managed  by himself. Hence,  a  and  C should  be set  so that the  expected
size of the principal's  lease income  equals  the rent presently  extracted
from the firm.  The bidder  who offers  the  principal  the  highest expected
lease  payment  wins.
Finally,  a problem  arises  if there  are several  agents  who  want to
become  the  lessee  and they  have  different  attitudes  to  risk.  The  winner  of
such an auction  is again the  bidder  who offers  the  principal  the highest
expected  lease  payment.  Since  we have assumed  that the  principal  is risk
neutral,  the  two  schemes  can  be compared.-26-
V.  INSTITUTIONALIZING  ENTERPRISE  REFORMS
BASED  ON A PRINCIPAL-AGENT  RELATIONSHIP
This paper  attempts  to reform  state  owned  enterprises  by leasing
them to entrepreneurs. It specifies  lease  payments  to the state  based  on
fee schedules from the principal-agent literature.  The aim of the
principal  (the  state)  in this  literature  is to  get  his  agents  to  act in  his
interest.  He does so by rewarding the lessees according to observed
actions  and/or  outcomes.  However,  since  the reform  process is based on
the fact that the state is unable to manage state owned enterprises
efficiently, the  principal  (state)  must rely  only  on observed  performance
as  measured  by the  pure  profit  level  of the  firm. To implement  the sharing
rules  between  the lessee  and the lessor,  auction  theory  is used.  More
specifically, a first-price  sealed  bid auction  with reservation  prices  is
recommended.
The reason for using principal-agent  theory in the setting of
enterprise  reform is because it has several  desirable  qualities.  Among
these is the ability  to delegate  responsibility  in an efficient  way. As
mentioned  in the introduction  to this  paper,  some  problems  seem to be more
burdensome in the context of enterprise reform than others.  In the
following, we will discuss these explicitly within a principal-agent
framework.
The problem of ownership  of assets.  Experience  makes it clear
that, because  public  enterprises  do  not own  their  own  assets,  they  have  no
incentive  to accumulate  and manage  those  assets  as they are not rewarded-27-
for doing  so efficiently. The question  of the ownership  of assets  is in
reality  a principal-agent  problem.  Any authority  representing  the state
must be given incentives to duplicate the state's interest.  This is
exactly  why lease payments  are derived  from the principal-agent  theory.
Hence,  these fee schedules  are the ideal  solution  to the problem  of the
ownership  of assets. There  is  no need  for  any  other  authority  to represent
the  state.
It is worth  stressing  that the  lessee  subject  to the  outlined  fee
schedules  is the best authority  to manage the firm's  assets.  Any other
authority,  such as a board,  is nothing  but an agent  for the state,  and an
inefficient  one.  Hence, there is no need for a board if the  management
acts  as an agent.
One  problem  that is prone  to arise  regardless  of who is acting  as
an owner  on behalf  of the state  is that the  agent  always  has an incentive
to sell assets  to increase  the firm's  profits  and thereby  his fee.  This
must be countered  by not allowing  such sales to have an impact  on  the
derivation  of the  fee  schedules. Since  such  sales  can  easily  be monitored,
this  rule can be enforced  despite  any informational  asymmetry  between the
principal  and  the  agent.
Budget:  and credit constraints.  The elimination  of loss-making
firms  is one  of the  main purpcses  of an enterprise  reform. However,  loss-
making  firms  can be made profitable  again.  This can be done by changing
the  incentive  structure  that  governs  these  firms  through  leasing
arrangements. However,  this task  might take time and require  investment.-28-
Let us first consider  the aspect  of time.  Even after a lessee  has taken
over an enterprise,  the firm may still make losses.  The question is
whether  the state  should  let  the  lessee  continue  to  manage  the  firm. Since
it is uncertain  whether  the losses  can  be converted  to profits  over time,
the government  has two options.  First,  it can give the lessee  a second
chance, recognizing  that there  might be some learning  effect  or unlucky
circumstances  involved.  This strategy  involves  giving  the lessee  credit
either to cover his losses  or to reinvest.  Second, the government  can
evaluate the lessee strictly by his performance.  In this case, the
government  should  base its action  on the alternative  value of the firm.
This  value  can either  be represented  through  another  lessee  or  by the  state
running  the firm  by itself.
The investment  requirements  needed for a reform  process are, by
definition, not known to the state.  Any potential  lessee  will calculate
these costs and make his bid for the contract  according  to the expected
reward.  The lessee's  investment  plans  necessitates  that funding  be made
available. We will argue  that  this  should  be done  through  a private  credit
market  to ensure  an efficient  allocation  of capital. A privately  governed
credit  market  must itself  bear  the  burden  of unprofitable  projects  and  has,
therefore, the strongest incentives  to evaluate the risks of lending.
Furthermore,  only through  a market  based  process  of demand  and supply  can
the  opportunity  cost of capital  be properly  assessed. Both these  arguments
should  make it clear  that any  reform  process  concerning  public  enterprises
must  be supported  by some  market  based  banking  system.-29-
Price  and  wage regulations. The  price  regulations  still  existing
in many socialist  economies  distort  the real  cost of resources  and create
artificially  profitable  firms.  Any serious reform  efforts  must realize
that prices  are supposed  to reflect  the relative  scarcity  of factors  and
are,  therefore,  at the core of the reform process.  However,  the
widespread  use of price regulations  can probably  not be done away with
instantaneously.  As pointed  out above,  this  obstac'l  must  be countered  by
charging  leased  enterprises  border  prices  on input  factors  and  allow  prices
on final  goods  to  be set  freely.
CONCLUSION
The  above analysis tries to reform loss making state owned
enterprises in socialist economies.  Since the state has proven to be
incompetent  in its management  of state  owned enterprises  a new structure
must be found that takes into account  the incompetence  of the state  but
ensures that the state's  economic  interests  are preserved  the best way
possible.  Two of the most difficult  tasks in this process is how to
exercise  ownership  rights to assets  and simultaneously  delegate  decision
making  to the  management  of the  firm. The  paper  finds  that  the  solution  of
these  problems  is to lease  state  owned  enterprises  to  entrepreneurs  through
contracts  derived  from the principal-agent  literature  where the state is
the  principal  and  the  agent  is  the  lessee.
Contracts  based on principal-agent  relationships  are designed  to
provide incentives for hirelings who  cannot be  observed during their
performance. The informational  asymmetry  necessitates  a contract  based  on-30-
observable  outcomes  under  which the hireling's  supervisor  makes a payment
to the hireling that induces  him to take actions  leading to the wanted
outcome.  Since  the  state needs  to  delegate responsibility to  the
management  of state owned enterprises,  the process of reform  becomes in
reality  a principal-agent  problem.  By leasing  state  owned  enterprises  to
entrepreneurs,  and  subjecting  them  to fee  schedules  derived  from  the  theory
of principal  and  agent,  state  owned  enterprises  can  be managed  efficiently.
As shown above, by tailor making these fee schedules,  the lessee  will
implicitly  be given incentives  to exercise  property rights efficiently.
Moreover,  a lease  contract  has the advantage  that it may be more viable
politically  since  it does not alter  the structure  of ownership  and can be
easily  terminated.
The  main problem  attached  to the  use of principal-agent  contracts
to reform state owned enterprises  is that contracts  must be defined  to
evaluate  the performance  of state  owned  enterprises  based on some neutral
measure  not affected  by the state's  incompetence. The paper claims  that
the incompetence  of the state to evaluate  actions does not obstruct  the
finding  of such as measure,  and that this measure is the  profit level  of
the firm.  There  are three  reasons  for  using the  profit  level  of the firm.
First,  maximizing  the profit  of the firm is in the interest  of both the
state and the lessee  since their income  from th'e  lease depends  upon the
level  of profit.  Second,  we know from  micro-theory  that  profit  maximizing
behavior leads to an efficient use of input factors.  In a socialist
economy,  this may pose a problem  since  prices  do not necessarily  reflect
resource  scarcities. The problem  of price  distortions  can  be overcome  by-31-
subjecting  the firm to border  prices  or if they exist,  market  prices on
input  factors  and simultaneously  allowing  the firm to set  prices  on final
goods  freely. Third,  the  profit  of the firm  can  be monitored  and  provided
good  control  mechanisms  is  hard to  manipulate.
To facilitate  the reform  process it is necessary  to establish  a
credit  market  because  the  lessee  may have investment  plans  that  need to be
financed. To ensure  that  capital  is efficiently  allocated,  the  opportunity
cost of capital  must  be determined  in a  market  created  by supply  and  demand
forces.
So far no country  has yet tried  to implement  lease  schemes  based
on principal-agent  contracts.  Some efforts,  however,  such as in China,
have  come  very close  to derive  systems  of reward  in  public  enterprises  thai
look surprisingly much alike what  the theory of principal and agent
suggests. Future  work needs  to build a bridge  between  theory  and reality
to see  whether  they  both can  benefit  from  the  interaction.-32-
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